Al-Shabaab’s potential capture of Mogadishu poses a severe threat to the Horn of Africa, with Kenya facing particular risks due to its proximity and history with the group. Al-Shabaab’s resurgence, demonstrated by territorial gains and the near-assassination of President Mohamud, could further destabilize Somalia, creating a power vacuum that strengthens the militants’ regional influence. If Mogadishu falls, Al-Shabaab could establish a base to export its ideology and violence, directly threatening neighbouring countries
There are reports that Al-Shabaab may be preparing to seize control of Mogadishu as early as April 2025, according to an Italian news outlet, AGC News. The militant group has mobilized three battalions, including both domestic and foreign fighters, Special Forces units, and equipment, to exploit the ongoing political tensions within the Somali government.
Their strategy appears to be establishing a government based on Sharia law, capitalizing on the instability of the capital. Intelligence from Somali and U.S. sources suggests this operation could unfold within the next few weeks.
Why This Is Dangerous For The Region And Kenya
Al-Shabaab’s potential capture of Mogadishu poses a severe threat to the Horn of Africa, with Kenya facing particular risks due to its proximity and history with the group. Al-Shabaab’s resurgence, demonstrated by territorial gains and the near-assassination of President Mohamud, could further destabilize Somalia, creating a power vacuum that strengthens the militants’ regional influence. If Mogadishu falls, Al-Shabaab could establish a base to export its ideology and violence, directly threatening neighbouring countries.
Kenya, sharing a porous 700-kilometer border with Somalia, is especially vulnerable. An ambush in Garissa County recently killed six Kenyan police officers; the attack was attributed to Al-Shabaab’s cross-border raids. The group has a history of retaliating against Kenya for its military presence in Somalia as part of the African Union mission, with attacks like the 2013 Westgate Mall siege and the 2015 Garissa University massacre. Al-Shabaab’s control of areas near Mogadishu could embolden further incursions into Kenya, targeting both military and civilian sites.
The political instability in Somalia exacerbates these risks. The Somali government’s focus on internal conflicts diverts resources from counterterrorism, potentially allowing Al-Shabaab to consolidate power. For Kenya, this could mean increased refugee flows, strained security resources, and economic disruption in border regions like Garissa and Lamu, already identified as high-risk by a U.S. Embassy advisory. A stronger Al-Shabaab foothold in Mogadishu could also disrupt regional trade and stability, affecting Kenya’s role as a key economic hub in East Africa.
Al-Shabaab has reportedly deployed 3,000 fighters and 200 elite soldiers to areas surrounding Daru Salaam and Afgoi, positioning itself to challenge the Somali government’s authority. The group aims to secure Mogadishu and persuade several Somali ministers and parliamentarians to join them in forming a new administration. The militants have already gained significant ground, controlling strategic towns in the Middle Shabelle region. The President of the State fled Giohar after negotiating with Al-Shabaab to cede control of the Giohar and Mahadayweyne districts. Additionally, Al-Shabaab holds the Balad district, just 30 kilometres north of Mogadishu, employing a strategy of encircling the capital, reminiscent of the Syrian model used by HTS in December—to pressure the government into surrender.
Reports also indicate that fighters from Daesh and al-Qaeda have been relocated from Syria to Somalia, as evidenced by photo reports from the Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production. This influx of external militants heightens the threat. On March 15, Al-Shabaab targeted the military base at Awdhegle, seizing weapons and ammunition, further bolstering their capabilities amid the Somali government’s internal struggles.
President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s administration is grappling with significant political turmoil, including efforts to normalize relations with Ethiopia, conflicts with federal member states, and disputes with opposition parties. This unstable environment provides Al-Shabaab with a favourable opportunity. On March 18, the group attacked the President’s convoy in Mogadishu’s Xamar-Jajab district at 10:32 AM as he travelled to the port of Adale. The assault killed four local radio journalists, though the President emerged unharmed. Subsequent attacks followed, targeting the Halane military base on March 19 and the Sabiid military base, 40 kilometres west of Mogadishu, on March 20.
In response, Somalia’s Ministry of Information, Culture, and Tourism stated on March 18 that the Somali National Army (SNA) has intensified operations against Al-Shabaab, pushing the militants from rural Middle Shabelle strongholds. The SNA claims to have repelled advances near the Sabiid area and the K-50 military base near Afgoi, killing several Al-Qaeda members, including commanders. In Mogadishu’s Daynile and Dharkenley districts, the Somali National Intelligence Agency (NISA) arrested four nationals suspected of planning attacks, signalling heightened security measures.
In summary, Al-Shabaab’s potential move on Mogadishu threatens to unravel Somalia’s fragile governance, with ripple effects that could overwhelm Kenya’s security apparatus and destabilize the broader region.
